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The Trouble with Phenomenology     
Pannill Camp
Ineluctable modality of the visible:  at least that if no more, 
thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here 
to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty 
boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust:  coloured signs. Limits of 
the diaphane. But, he adds:  in bodies.
                                                                —James Joyce, Ulysses
Joyce probes the limits of perception as Stephen Dedalus walks Sandymount 
Strand. Dedalus crushes seashells under his shoes, examining his ability to perceive 
what is outside himself. If there is nothing certain about external reality, he ponders, 
there is at least the sensation of perception, the sense that there are objects previous 
to consciousness, and that, even given the fallibility of our senses, there is some 
constancy—an “ineluctable modality”—if not to what we believe we see, then to 
how we believe we see it. This profound uncertainty is characteristic of the modern 
episteme, which Foucault designates as witnessing the separation of language from 
“things,” a reformulation of life science into systems and organicities, and the advent 
of the category of “man.” The questioning of the certainty of human knowledge 
opened up by Kant and Hegel inﬁltrated Joyce’s novels and was taken up directly 
by Joyce’s contemporary Edmund Husserl under the banner of phenomenology. 
Through a deliberate and rationally guided navigation of consciousness, Husserl 
would argue, one can describe the world that is available to perception in a way that 
is meaningful, dependable, and veriﬁable—in other words, one can undertake to 
mine consciousness in a particular way so as to gain a knowledge of the world that 
is everything but absolute. Husserl founded a “new eidetics,” rather than claiming 
to describe the indwelling essences of the world’s constituent objects, he sought 
to accumulate knowledge of the essences of objects of consciousness—to know 
the world from the inside-out.1 
Bert O. States ﬁrst applied Husserlian phenomenology in his critique of the 
semiotics of performance in the mid-1980s. Since then, phenomenology has become 
a familiar part of the performance studies vocabulary. Much of this derivation of 
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Husserl’s thought is speciﬁcally a derivation of the “phenomenological reduction,” 
also known as “bracketing,” “parenthesizing,” or “suspending” the “natural attitude” 
so as to isolate the essential qualities of the perception of a particular object. Yet 
these applications of the “phenomenological reduction” to theatre scholarship tend 
to do so with little regard for the welter of critique that has accumulated to Husserlian 
phenomenology since its founding, little attention to the problems of applying a 
highly normative and positivistic idea of consciousness, and little concern for the 
failure of phenomenology to produce a mode of performance scholarship essentially 
different from that which ignores phenomenology completely. To examine these 
issues is to ﬁnd the current mode of performance phenomenology inadequate to 
its task and in need of modiﬁcation. 
The following is intended to reﬂect upon the practice of phenomenological 
criticism of theatre by critiquing the belief structure of that practice at several 
nodes. After a brief characterization of the application of phenomenology to theatre 
scholarship, and in particular an accounting for the primacy of the phenomenological 
reduction within that scholarship, Husserl will be examined as a thinker of his 
time, as distinctively modern in the sense that he is secular (in a decidedly post-
Christian way), positivistic (in the sense of an explorer charting an undiscovered 
country), and normative in his characterizations of consciousness. In service 
of my proposal for a modiﬁed sense of phenomenological criticism, Derrida’s 
broad-ranging critique of Husserl will be brought to bear on the phenomenology 
of theatre at two locales:  those of genesis and language. It will be shown that, far 
from obliterating phenomenology, Derrida interrogates it to the point of putting an 
endless uncertainty at its center. The notion of différance, a product of Derrida’s 
meditations on Husserl, re-opens the question of presence that Husserl would close 
off, offering a play of meaning to those who embrace it. In my ﬁnal formulation, a 
deconstructed phenomenology beneﬁts from this sense of play as well as from the 
Derridean hospitality2 to the other, a welcoming that may address other interpretive 
constructions suited to the aims of theatre phenomenology. 
Parameters:  The Scope of the Argument
There is not one single phenomenology, nor one static and internally consistent 
version of the thought of Husserl.3 The present study is intended to address 
Husserlian phenomenology as it is applied to the study of theatre and, therefore, 
takes up Husserl in ways germane to the application of his thought to theatre 
studies. The impact of the argument will extend only so far as scholars of theatre 
claim recourse to the phenomenological reduction to support their descriptions 
of performance. Phenomenological criticism is a discursive practice that is not 
identical to Husserlian phenomenology, but neither is the former uninvolved with 
the latter. Therefore, this essay will be concerned with critiques of Husserl insofar 
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as they have ramiﬁcations for the peculiar ways in which he has been put to work 
in our ﬁeld. 
The Phenomenological “Epoch” in Theatre Scholarship
Since 1985, phenomenology has propagated through theatre scholarship, 
culminating in the inclusion of a “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” section in 
Janelle Reinelt and Joseph Roach’s inﬂuential 1992 anthology, Critical Theory 
and Performance. This inclusion cemented phenomenology within the theoretical 
repertoire of theatre and performance studies for more than a decade and into the 
present. Phenomenology is indispensable to any survey of performance theory, and 
it is conjured to use in a great variety of critical projects.4 
Any attempt to characterize this discursive practice must ﬁrst encounter 
Bert O. States, whose Great Reckonings in Little Rooms makes an eloquent and 
persuasive case for an alternative mindset with which to interpret theatre. States 
was by no means the ﬁrst to treat the experience of theatre and performance with 
phenomenology,5 but his advocacy of an extra-semiotic criticism was taken up 
with vigor in the nineties, and his shepherding of Edmund Husserl’s work—the 
bedrock of phenomenology—into theatre scholarship was emulated by those for 
whom the interpretive register of “culture,” as approached through the project of 
semiotics, lacked the means to convey the weight of the subjective experience of 
performance. States deploys his phenomenology within a larger critique of semiotics 
and new criticism:  
. . . the danger of a linguistic approach to theater is that one is apt 
to look past the site of our sensory engagement with its empirical 
objects. This site is the point at which art is no longer only a 
language. When the critic posits a division in the art image, he 
may be saying something about language, but he is no longer 
talking about art, or at least about the affective power of art. 6
The Burkeian deﬂection here is one from the semiotic/linguistic to the sensory/
affective.7 Phenomenology for States produces knowledge of the corporeal, the 
sensory, and the emotional:  it produces knowledge of the physiological dimension 
of performance experience as understood separately from a system of signs and 
referents. Though States will repeatedly position his phenomenological perspective 
as complementary to semiotic interpretation, the phenomenological side of the 
complement requires that referential associations be “reduced,” or “bracketed,” 
to isolate the aspects of object-apprehension that phenomenology holds at a 
premium. 
No one familiar with phenomenological criticism will be unacquainted with 
the phenomenological reduction:  the willful suspension of our everyday belief in 
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the factually existent world as such, the suspension of the automatic interpretation 
we do of our surroundings. In the tradition of Husserl, this reduction is said to 
provisionally invalidate the hazy assumptions that mediate between the incomplete 
perceptual data received at every present moment about a given object and the 
artiﬁcially complete version of that object presented in the mind. What is leftover 
once this is done, according to States, is the “thing itself,” free of interpretations, 
connotations, and denotations, free of assumptions, memories, biases, and spin. 
The remainder of consciousness in the phenomenological attitude is evaluated 
as a freshly estranged experience of an otherwise familiar object. It is a type of 
awareness akin to Victor Shklovsky’s “defamiliarization.”8 States advocates the 
phenomenological attitude toward the production of a new kind of knowledge of 
objects in performance, a knowledge speciﬁcally attuned to the facts of presence 
that make performance itself unique to representational arts. 
A great deal of phenomenological writing is writing about the phenomenological 
method. But what may be said of the knowledge of performance that is produced by 
its rigorous application? A survey of phenomenological writing on theatre shows that 
it is manifested in a poetic language and is concerned with presence. States gives 
examples of the writing generated by a phenomenologically altered perception. In 
Great Reckonings, he recounts a moment of altered perception of a familiar object: 
“I am walking to the bus terminal to get my ride home. Suddenly, as I approach, 
the bus parked in the lot strikes me as being outrageously large and rectangular. It 
is heavy with material and texture; it is not a bus, it is a queer, unforeseen shape.”9 
The poetic, defamiliarizing mode of language applied to the bus is reinstated in 
States’s essay in Critical Theory and Performance. Here States invokes Barthes’s 
“punctum,” the arresting use of words that makes the text come alive in surprising 
ways. Barthes’s comparison of Greta Garbo’s face in her ﬁlm Queen Christina to 
the “ﬂour-white complexion of Charlie Chaplin, the dark vegetation of his eyes,” 
is for States “the creation of a new phenomenon, something without a history of 
signiﬁcation.”10 The measure of phenomenological writing, as well as the proof of 
its worth, are found in writing that disrupts expectations, writing in a poetic mode. 
Despite the factual non-presence of Greta Garbo’s face, to Barthes, States, and 
the reader of States in this example, phenomenology is concerned with presence, 
the immediacy of the object to the phenomenological critic. States describes his 
relapse into the “natural attitude,” the default, non-phenomenological mode of 
consciousness. Once he boards the bus described in his example, he starts to 
think over what he will do when he arrives home:  “All of these anticipations are 
softened, however, because on the bus I read a newspaper, which is another way 
of not being where I am.” Phenomenology for States is being where one is, being 
present to objects just as they are present to him. 
It is necessary to pause here in order to fend off a vulgarized reading of 
States’s phenomenological attitude. While this essay will go on to point out the 
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ideologies and internal contradictions that inhere to Husserlian phenomenology, this 
baggage is not wholly imported to the phenomenology of Great Reckonings. States 
disclaims that this book is not a rigorous phenomenology and goes so far as to say 
that “it does not have an argument, or set out to prove a thesis.”11 States’s Great 
Reckonings is not a crusade to reduce performance to an array of static essences; it 
is not a ﬁeld guide to the pure experience of theatre. States, in fact, wants to keep 
a sense of playfulness in our responses to theatre, rather than giving them over to 
a totalizing system of codes. This study does not cross-apply criticisms of Husserl 
directly to States and other phenomenologists of theatre. Such critics marshal 
phenomenology toward an articulation of the limits of semiotics and culture, but 
do so with particular attunement to the sensory and affective, with a vocabulary 
of immediacy, vitality, and essence, and with attention directed at some objects of 
performance more than others. 
It is common to hear phenomenology applied to certain things on stage: 
animals, open ﬂames, the bodies of actors—objects of particular interest. Wanda 
Strukus employs phenomenology toward an understanding of masks and puppets, 
while Carrie Sandahl applies phenomenology to an accounting for the role of 
disability in performance space.  It is curious that the discourse of phenomenological 
theatre criticism ﬁnds some objects to be more “phenomenological” than others, 
yet in the context of phenomenology’s application within the ﬁeld as an alternative 
to strictly linguistic analysis, it is not surprising to ﬁnd a pattern in the way that 
phenomenology is applied. The phenomenology of theatre addresses itself to 
objects that, for varying purposes, are not to be read as signs for something else. 
It is employed as a theoretical framework for the articulation of the affective and 
purely sensory, as well as the situational in performance studies. Phenomenologists 
emphasize what is felt and lived, rather than read. Phenomenology allows theater 
scholars to bracket, among other things, the semiotic reading of an object in the 
way that States initially explained. It also introduces a discourse of “essences,” 
which is not the least interesting aspect of this practice. 
Some phenomenologists of theatre take care to play down the sense of 
overdetermination linked to “essence” in the post-structuralist academy. In Bodied 
Spaces:  Phenomenology and Performance in Contemporary Drama, Stanton 
Garner invokes a phenomenology concerned with “modes of given-ness intrinsic 
to experience, and seek[ing] to uncover the invariable structure of these modes.”12 
Indeed, Husserlian phenomenology is concerned with the structure of experience 
and the essences of mental processes. Husserl does not make qualitative statements 
about objects outside of himself previous to perception, warning, “One must not let 
oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending consciousness 
or as ‘existing in itself.’”13 Objects for Husserl are always objects of consciousness; 
these are believed to “correlate” with the actual world, yet there is a gulf:  “a 
veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality.”14 
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The phenomenology of theatre, however, claims access to the essences of 
objects themselves. In Joseph Roach’s words, “the intuitive apprehension and 
penetrating description of such ﬁrst-order phenomena constitute the agenda 
of phenomenologists,” and “phenomenology . . . relies upon ‘essences,’ a set 
of necessary and sufﬁcient considerations for the existence of an entity, the 
fundamental supposition of essentialism.”15 I will assert that the discourse of 
phenomenology in theatre classrooms does not distinguish between the essences 
of conscious objects and the indwelling essences of objects in the world. This 
“penetrating description” is conceived in the phenomenology of performance as 
the gleaning of knowledge from the object out in the world that is new, pure, and 
affectively weighted in a way that is inaccessible to the observer uninitiated in the 
ways of the phenomenological reduction. 
Husserl in the Modern Episteme 
Michel Foucault famously unpacks the fault line between the classical mode 
of thought—wherein the world was encountered in a pre-arranged order of 
resemblances and similitudes—and the modern mode—wherein the classical tabular 
organization of living things, transparency of language, and study of economic 
value fell prey to sciences focused on the mystery of life, the opaque density of 
languages that were now separated from their referents, and the study of labor. In 
the modern episteme, Foucault claims, there emerged a curious new category to be 
known, which was at once sovereign and subjected:  the “empirico-transcendental 
doublet,” man. This momentous shift in how man thought himself in relation to 
his world bore consequences for the philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries; Foucault asserts that:
The question is no longer:  How can experience of nature give rise 
to necessary judgments? But rather:  How can man think what he 
does not think, inhabit as though by mute occupation something 
that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that 
takes the form of a stubborn exteriority? 16
“To think the unthought” is for Foucault the unspoken mandate of philosophy in 
the condition of modernity. The unthought is the site of an endless excavation that 
promises to bring humanity, by an accumulation of empirical knowledge, closer to 
transcendence of his newly ﬁnite condition. Foucault ﬁnds Husserl’s phenomenology 
in the service of this mandate:  “If phenomenology has any allegiance it is to . . . 
interrogation concerning man’s mode of being and his relation to the unthought.”17 
This characterization obtains in Husserl’s introduction to the 1931 edition of Ideas 
I, where he portrays his forays into the realm of pure consciousness:
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(He) who for decades instead of speculating concerning a New 
Atlantis has really wandered in the trackless wilds of a new 
continent and undertaken bits of virgin cultivation, will not allow 
himself to be diverted by the refusals of geographers who judge 
the reports in the light of their own experiences and habits of 
thought . . .18
Phenomenology is a philosophy formed within a speciﬁc historical moment, and it 
bears the marks of a special kind of positivism, a post-Christian orientation toward 
knowledge and the unknown, and a normative concept of consciousness. The ﬁrst 
of these three observations may take the quote above as its point of departure. 
Husserl’s metaphor of the explorer is not rendered capriciously. For him, the 
phenomenological reduction is a method whose rigorous application gives access 
to the realm of pure, transcendental consciousness, to the eidetic sphere (sphere of 
essences), which has the galvanizing virginity of an undiscovered country. Also, 
Husserl “exclude(s) all sciences relating to this natural world” in order to effect 
his phenomenological reduction, but this is simply a temporary bracketing that 
serves to establish phenomenology as “a science of a novel kind.”19 To the extent 
that 1) the project of phenomenology is to mine this territory for knowledge, and 
2) phenomenology is deployed as a new kind of science, phenomenology is a 
positivist project in the sense that it claims to gather up information toward the 
advancement of human understanding. It participates in the grand telos of Western 
metaphysics and sciences to discover the principles at the foundation of knowledge 
and the being of man through the “pure” thinking of the unthought. 
Husserl conceives of his phenomenology as the point of access to the realm of 
pure consciousness, and in this sense Husserl takes on the role of the prophet, and 
phenomenology a secular prophesy. Husserl writes that he “sees the inﬁnite open 
country of the true philosophy, the ‘promised land’ on which he himself will never 
set foot.”20 Here one sees extended the positivist quality of phenomenology by its 
distinctly colonialist logic, and also begins to read phenomenology as indebted to 
Christianity for its tropology.21 Phenomenology resonates with the belief structure of 
Christianity in that it requires initiation through the rigorous voluntary application 
of its tenets (at the guidance of Husserl the prophet). Once applied in its several 
steps and with some difﬁculty, the initiate is freed from the trappings of the natural 
attitude, temporarily escapes the factually existent world and gains access to a realm 
of purity and transcendence. In fact, the familiar terms that have been translated to 
describe the phenomenological reduction (bracketing, reducing, parenthesizing) can 
also be translated as “abstaining.”22 The phenomenological initiate refrains from 
positing the existence of the natural world in the same way a Christian convert 
may abstain from sex, bad language, or strong drink. These tropes of puriﬁcation 
and visual access to a transcendent realm mark phenomenology as the recipient 
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of an ancient and habitual orientation toward knowledge and experience. For the 
phenomenologist, as for the Christian, knowledge of one’s situation is not all equal, 
but is to be ranked according to its proximity to the transcendent. 
Phenomenology also sets out a model of consciousness that is unabashedly 
normative. For Husserl, his is the model of all consciousness, a fact he knows by 
access to the expressed thoughts of others, who can be found to agree with him. 
His model of the natural attitude speaks for himself, but in tone and by the logic 
of his project, for us all:
We begin our considerations as human beings who are living 
naturally, objectivating, judging, feeling, willing in the natural 
attitude. What that signiﬁes we shall make clear in simple 
meditations which can best be carried out in the ﬁrst person 
singular. 
   I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space . . .23 
This rhetorical turn from the “we” to the “I” is justiﬁed within phenomenology 
because Husserl cannot in fact live any interior life but his own. Thus the normative 
formulation is one that 1) locates the lived experience of Edmund Husserl at the 
center and extends the model of his consciousness outward onto all others, and 2) 
discounts those others whose lived experience is not analogous with that of Edmund 
Husserl. This observation doesn’t destroy the validity of phenomenology; in fact, the 
commonality of experience across subjectivities is precisely the stakes of the game 
for Husserl. It does, however, leave to the side considerations of the peculiarities 
of consciousness within and across cultural and gender lines, at different stages in 
development from birth to maturity, and the radical alterations of consciousness 
described in states of trance or meditation and those observed under the inﬂuence 
of narcotics and environmental factors. 
Phenomenology, according to Husserl, despite its current applications to theatre 
and performance, is a product of a speciﬁc intellectual/historical moment and has 
been considerably weakened by developments in philosophy and critical theory that 
have followed it. Its conditions of possibility as thought did not include the critiques 
of patriarchy, structuralism, and language that came after it. Husserl could not have 
foreseen these developments; indeed Husserl’s thought itself was constituent of 
the conditions of possibility of the later critiques. Nowhere is this aspect of the 
genealogical involvement of phenomenology with today’s critical theory more 
evident than in Husserl’s reworking by and incorporation into deconstruction.
The Problems of Genesis and Language in the Phenomenological Reduction
The specter of deconstruction or Derridean analysis is born from a 
characterization of that analysis as irreverent and destructive. It is derided as a 
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reﬂexive aversion to essentialism so forceful that it acts like a powerful solvent, 
razing structures of meaning to dust, or dissolving them into primordial soup. 
Deconstruction intimately understood is not destructive but productive. It introduces 
playfulness into our interpretations by showing how metaphysical principles 
rest upon a foundation that trembles with uncertainty. By exposing the internal 
contradictions papered over by philosophy, deconstruction points out problems 
of meaning that were already there, but rather than obliterating otherwise sturdy 
meaning, Derrida re-opens the possibility of an abundance of meaning. In this 
sense, deconstruction operates like a phenomenology of philosophy, immobilizing 
assumptions and questioning familiarity. 
This is to be expected considering Derrida’s intimate knowledge of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, which occupied the early phase of his career. In The Problem of 
Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy, An Introduction to the Origin of Geometry, Speech 
and Phenomena, as well as in essays in Writing and Difference and Margins of 
Philosophy, Derrida canvases Husserl’s phenomenological project, not to destroy it, 
but to productively expose its contradictions toward the creation of the method of 
deconstruction. As John D. Caputo interprets, the work of Derrida is “not an attack 
upon Husserl but a liberation of Husserl’s deepest tendencies.”24 Similarly, Leonard 
Lawlor characterizes Derrida’s criticism as a “super-phenomenological critique” 
and accredits the Derridean concept of différance to the paradox of intentionality 
and noema in Husserl.25 Derrida’s critique of phenomenology is concerned with 
1) its satisfaction with a metaphysics of presence that closes off the problem of 
accounting for genesis without the necessary evidence to do so, and 2) the deferral 
by Husserl of the problem of language, which puts in doubt the possibility of a 
phenomenological reduction in the ﬁrst place. 
The issue of genesis is taken up by Derrida ﬁrst in his student thesis, The 
Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy and then condensed and revised in 
“‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology,” published in Writing and Difference. 
In both texts Derrida observes Husserl inaugurating the phenomenological 
reduction to satisfy the structural demand (that for a “comprehensive 
description of a totality, of a form or function organized according to an internal 
legality . . .”) in priority over and at the expense of the genetic demand (“the search 
for the origin and foundation of the structure”).26 Consequently, the description 
of the phenomenological reduction found in Ideas I and its resulting access to the 
realm of pure consciousness tends to avoid issues of genesis and temporality. In 
other words, it describes essences in stasis, without a sense of where these have 
come from or of how objects originally “become” to consciousness. These priorities 
are not new to Husserl at this stage in his thought. They were crucial to his early 
work on the origin of mathematical unities. According to Derrida, the fact that 
Husserl sought to “maintain simultaneously the normative autonomy of logical 
or mathematical ideality as concerns all factual consciousness, and its original 
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dependence in relation to a subjectivity in general; in general, but concretely,” 
paved the way for the phenomenological reduction.27 In other words, the idea that 
mathematical entities are at once uniform and yet never found prior to their iteration 
in consciousness provided a concept of structure and genesis that led Husserl to try 
to similarly isolate the structure and genesis of other objects of consciousness. 
Husserl copes with the problem of genesis by closing it into a metaphysical 
principle, his “principle of principles” (the self-evidence of that which is given 
to consciousness). For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction gives access to 
objects that are at once taken up actively by the intentionality of consciousness (the 
need for consciousness to be always a consciousness “of something”) and received 
passively by virtue of their presence. The critical and ultimately unresolved question 
for Derrida is how these objects in their essence can be constituted as meaning in 
a way that is both foreign and native to consciousness:  
Noema, which is the objectivity of the object, the meaning and the 
“as such” of the thing for consciousness, is neither the determined 
thing itself in its untamed existence (whose appearing the noema 
precisely is) nor is it a properly subjective moment, a “really” 
subjective moment, since it is indubitably given as an object for 
consciousness. It is neither of the world nor of consciousness, but 
it is the world or something of the world for consciousness.28
By elaborating the essences of consciousness in a non-temporal structure, Husserl 
avoids the problem of the genesis of the empirical. Derrida notes that, “In fact—and 
this is the primary cause of all the difﬁculties in Ideas I—the world is not considered 
in its ‘reality’ during these analyses, but in its noematic value. Husserl never 
envisages in Ideas the relation of real substrate with its noematic sense which will 
deﬁne the problem of a genesis of sense.”29 The resulting paradox is elaborated 
concisely in Derrida’s later work “Form and Meaning.” Drawing from Husserl’s 
early work on math and logic, he places language at the center of the noematic 
formation, since Husserl has said that even numbers must be “expressed” from 
their foundations in a sense attainable by consciousness. Therefore, this lower, prior 
stratum must impress itself onto “sense” so that it can express itself to consciousness. 
The expression simultaneously takes up and gives off a constituted meaning:
Thus, the preexpressive noema, the prelinguistic sense, must 
be imprinted in the expressive noema, must ﬁnd its conceptual 
mark in the content of the meaning. Expression, in order to limit 
itself to transporting a constituted sense to the exterior, and 
by the same token to bring this sense to conceptual generality 
without altering it, in order to express what is already thought 
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(one almost would have to say written), and in order to redouble 
faithfully—expression then must permit itself to be imprinted by 
sense at the same time as it expresses sense.30
This inscrutable relation between the pre-expressive layer of meaning and the 
linguistic substance in which it is given to consciousness bears consequences for the 
problem of writing, but no less so for the ﬁrst-order perception of phenomenology. 
Whatever experience of the object is produced by the phenomenological reduction, it 
only presents itself (it can only present itself) in particularities of sense—these can be 
thought of, for example, as the pre-linguistic correlates of Bert States’s memorable 
experience with the bus. Yet an interrogation of the source of these constituted sense 
particulars can lead only to another constituted sense of indeterminate origin, the 
beginning of an interminable series of sloughings-off of concrete shells from an 
object that interminably recedes from view. Moreover, the fact that the direction of 
this recession lies into, impossibly, both the transcendent (external) world and the 
immanent (mental) world amounts to a permanent contradiction for Derrida. “The 
constituting origin of lived experience is in the lived experience and outside the 
lived experience, in time and outside time, and so on, and one cannot exclusively 
determine absolute originarity in one sense or the other.”31
It is easy to see the problem that language itself would pose to a phenomenology 
of theatre even if one could account for the constitution of perceived objectivities. 
How could an experience of an object properly isolated by the phenomenological 
reduction be transmitted to someone else? This paradox was pointed out by Eugen 
Fink in his early work on Husserl. If the phenomenologist has surpassed the natural 
attitude, he or she may not rightfully be said to communicate to those who remain in 
that state. Husserl leaves the problem of language to the side in Ideas I, preferring 
to group it in with the natural attitude so that its intricacies can be simply “put out 
of action.” Yet the impossibility of demonstrating the fealty of speech or writing 
to whatever pre-expressive impulses shape them makes language into a problem 
for the phenomenologist. Bert States noted the problem of meaning’s relation to 
language when he wrote, “language itself contains an even more virulent form 
of frontality.”32 That is, the arbitrary relation of the symbols of language to their 
referents and the indeterminacy of those linkages amount to a condition wherein the 
impulse that motivates any speech act cannot be said to ﬁll its linguistic receptacle 
without risk of ﬁltration, distortion, or spillover. Derrida dissects Husserl’s attempts 
to assert a transparency of language. Of the Husserlian metaphor of a weaving into 
language of a pre-linguistic meaning, he observes, “What is woven as language is 
that the discursive warp cannot be construed as warp and takes the place of a woof 
that has not truly preceded it. This texture is all the more inextricable in that it is 
highly signiﬁcant:  the nonexpressive threads are not without signiﬁcation.”33 But 
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for Derrida the consequences of this inextricability, should the phenomenologist 
fail to meticulously unweave it, are profound:
If the description does not bring light to an absolutely and simply 
founding ground of signiﬁcation, if an intuitive and perceptive 
ground, a pedestal of silence, does not found discourse in the 
originally given presence of the thing itself, if the texture of the 
text, in a word, is irreducible, not only will the phenomenological 
description have failed, but the descriptive “principle” itself 
will have been put back into question. The stakes of this 
disentanglement are therefore the phenomenological motif 
itself.34
This analysis separates the language produced by a subject from the meaning 
stratum that is supposed to formulate it and, thereby, calls into question the status 
of phenomenological writing. But Derrida’s critique of phenomenology on the 
level of language has a more radical dimension. As Caputo notes, Husserl brackets 
language to gain access to the realm of essences in a transaction that is ultimately 
monological and mute, “a realm of pure linguistic expression, free from mundane 
interference and opacity.”35 Husserl dissociates the apprehension of transcendent, 
actual objects from mental processes, which are given immanently, absolutely 
and without frontality. Yet Derrida doesn’t rein language in at the border of Fink’s 
paradox of outward expression. Extending Husserl’s analysis of the linguistic 
generation of mathematical entities, Derrida radicalizes the issue of language by 
linking it to the problem of genesis. Lawlor explains:
For Derrida, the Finkian question of a “transcendental language” 
will be deepened in The Origin of Geometry, where Husserl will 
make language, indeed writing, fundamental in the constitution 
of ideal objects. That writing is necessary in the constitution (or 
institution) of ideal objects means that language precedes all the 
distinctions that Husserl makes on the basis of the reduction.36
This is true both in the sense that phenomenology itself, as the guide to the 
“undiscovered country” of transcendental idealities, is entirely ﬁgured in language, 
as well as in the sense that linguistic categories are prior to and found in the 
symbolic distinctions that open the realm up to the phenomenologist in the ﬁrst 
place. Language is a problem for the phenomenologist, therefore, not only in the 
composition and transmission of phenomenological texts, but also at the crucial 
ﬁrst moment of phenomenology, when the natural attitude is suspended and the 
“object itself” apprehended by virtue of its presence. This problem in Husserl has 
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been noted by his many interlocutors, including Wolfgang Walter Fuchs.37 Husserl 
aims to make language a secondary problem whose intricacies one could abstain 
from in a moment of transcendental consciousness, but Derrida shows how the 
presence of the object itself depends on a movement and separation at the heart 
of language.38
The realm of the transcendental in Husserl is, for Derrida, shadowed off 
from its mundane counterpart in a trope of parallelism that is the gateway to 
différance. The ﬁguring of the transcendental ego takes the place of an alter-ego 
for the phenomenological traveler and thus instates a relation to “my” self that 
is paradoxically situated, like the noema with relation to consciousness, as both 
foreign and native. For Derrida, this parallelism, which spans nothing, sparks a new 
kind of difference:  “Husserl speciﬁes, for example, that my transcendental ego is 
radically different from my natural and human ego; and yet it is distinguished by 
nothing.”39 Whereas Husserl is inclined to ignore this nothing, this gulf between 
the mundane and the transcendent, as the very absent place of that which is 
excluded in the reduction, Derrida will read it as a productive aporia, the site to 
which “we must ceaselessly direct our questions.”40 The fact that language must 
be the material out of which this gulf is stretched in spite of itself—that it makes 
possible an articulation of the movement, the casting off, which makes language 
itself possible—casts light on a paradox in Husserl at the site of genesis that is the 
seed ground of deconstruction:
It is at the price of this war of language against itself that the 
sense and question of its origin will be thinkable. This war is 
obviously not one war among others. A polemic for the possibility 
of sense and world, it takes place in this difference, which, we 
have seen, cannot reside in the world but only in language, in 
the transcendental disquietude of language. Indeed, far from 
only living in language, this war is also the origin and residence 
of language. Language preserves the difference that preserves 
language.41
Where Husserl designates a realm of essences and transcendencies that amount 
to the foundation of experience in presence, Derrida inscribes an irreduced oscillation 
between self and other prior to and engendering of language itself. The formation 
of language immanent to consciousness is always a sending off, a departure and 
a deferral, as well as a differing (a différance) from consciousness, and as such it 
necessitates repetition for survival, an eternal return. This oscillation or “wobble,” 
as put by Caputo, alerts us to the radical alterity that faces us in the world where 
we would otherwise dam it up with metaphysical principles. This is what Derrida 
means when he claims that the debate between issues of genesis and structure in 
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Husserl “gives to the description its ‘animation,’ and whose incompleteness, which 
leaves every major stage of phenomenology unbalanced, makes new reductions 
and explications indeﬁnitely necessary.”42 The impossibility of phenomenology 
to deﬁnitively articulate the sphere of essences to its own or anyone’s satisfaction 
propels phenomenology into endless self-deﬁnition and condemns its practice to 
naïve assertions of access to essences that are always shifting, always shedding 
their skin. 
The Prospects for Phenomenology within Performance Studies
The phenomenological reduction as appropriated by scholars of theatre and 
performance is an outline of Edmund Husserl’s elaborate and rigorous “science” 
of phenomenology. It has come to stand for a “defamiliarizing,” or an isolation of 
essences, or a corporeal turn that emphasizes the life of bodies in performance. In 
some ways, the phenomenology of theatre has little to do with Husserl’s project. 
Phenomenology has provided a vocabulary for certain crucial aspects of the 
experience of witnessing performance that are not adequately translated into or 
understood as cultural matter. But Husserl’s name should not be invoked in ignorance 
of the historical moment that made his theory possible, the contradictions that trouble 
it, or of Derrida’s veritable dismantling of it under the banner of deconstruction. If 
scholars of performance go on invoking Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, they 
should at least be aware of these problems and be prepared to answer for them. If 
theatre scholarship elects to ignore Derrida’s critique of Husserl, it should at least 
know why it is choosing to do so. The Derridian critique, again, does not cause an 
obliteration of phenomenology but rather an opening up of the question of genesis 
and essence where phenomenology had closed the issues in the metaphysics of 
presence. Thus, an integration of deconstruction offers up a fundamentally altered 
practice of performance phenomenology, not a pile of ruins. What follows are three 
broad implications of the preceding argument for this new practice.
1. Phenomenological Criticism Does Not Need Phenomenology:
When Bert O. States introduced phenomenology to theatre studies, he did so to 
address the need for a complement to a strictly semiotic approach to performance. 
In order to limit semiotics’s “almost imperial conﬁdence in its product,”43 States 
marshaled Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Husserl toward the description of that 
which cannot be decoded in a moment of performance experience. The results of 
this move, as we have seen, manifest in writing that is markedly rich in affect, 
rhetorically loaded and poetic. But if the phenomenologist has given us these 
accounts of his or her journey into the realm of pure consciousness, the writing 
itself cannot convey the essence of its object. The phenomenological perspective 
would become “enworlded” at the point it tried to communicate itself to others in 
the natural attitude. The issue, then, is not whether we eradicate phenomenological 
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writing (one wants beautiful writing like that of States), but rather, if this writing 
is produced in the natural attitude, why does it need to invoke the technicalities 
of phenomenology in the ﬁrst place? It is possible to reformulate the objectives 
of phenomenological criticism without the phenomenological reduction. These 
would include:  a concentration on the sensory aspects of performance considered 
separately from their status as signiﬁers; writing on theatre that awakens new 
and surprising perspectives with affective weight and an attention to language; 
the description of the perceptual ﬁrst moments of the performance object as 
experienced by the spectator. I will argue that these tenets, by jettisoning the 
rhetoric of essences and metaphysics, bring the phenomenology of theatre into 
the contemporary moment and avoid the pitfalls linked to a reductive, positivist, 
and essentialist discourse. 
2. The Dangers of Essence:
Whatever qualiﬁcations phenomenology may make about the essences it 
claims to access, it cannot escape the rhetoric of purity and ideality that founded 
Husserl’s project. Husserl concedes that a worldly object cannot be known in the 
same precision as a geometric axiom, yet his incitement to approach “the things 
themselves” has implications in the social sphere. The claim to reduce any object 
to its essence, to grasp it in its transcendence cannot but do some violence to the 
ﬁeld of interpretations and experience that surround it. If, for example, we accept 
Roland Barthes’s description of Greta Garbo’s eyes (their similarity to Chaplin, 
their “dark vegetation”) as a glimpse of the essence of that image and, if we further 
suspend our concerns about the compound ﬁltrations and distortions perpetrated 
by language as the image is transferred from Barthes, to Barthes’s essay, to States 
and so on, we will have conceded an elision of alternative readings and experiences 
of that image. The necessity of understanding the self-difference of an object, a 
human being, or a culture has political ramiﬁcations. As Derrida explains at the 
Villanova Roundtable, the effect of différance is far from nihilistic; it is driven by 
a democratic impulse:
The identity of a culture is a way of being different from itself; a 
culture is different from itself; language is different from itself; 
the person is different from itself. Once you take into account this 
inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and 
you understand that ﬁghting for your own identity is not exclusive 
of another identity, is open to another identity. And this prevents 
totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism and so on.44
Deconstruction of the performance object, descended though it may be from the 
phenomenological reduction, works to reduce the reductiveness of that reduction. It 
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acknowledges a play of subject and object at the very origin of language. It guards 
against an unfounded metaphysics of the performance object. In the words of John 
Caputo, it preserves our “openness to the mystery.”
3. Beyond the Phenomenological Reduction
Husserl is widely regarded as the initiator of the phenomenological project as 
it is understood today, but the foundations of this project as laid out in Husserl’s 
thought have been reworked and built upon by numerous interlocutors. Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Ricouer, among others, have undertaken phenomenological 
investigations directed at art, perception, narrative, and other subjects. It should be 
noted that phenomenological criticism of theatre and performance has adopted these 
thinkers as well, evading, in some cases, the problems of the Husserlian reduction or 
modifying the reduction to be less essentialist. Additionally, critics like Foucault and 
Judith Butler have made use of the Husserlian reduction on a more or less explicit 
level towards analyses of historical knowledge and performed social formations. 
In these projects, the reduction of consciousness towards a pure encounter with 
the object has gradually passed away. Structuralist theories have shown language 
to be far from a transparent medium through which transcendental objects could 
be revealed and described. The problems of language articulated by Derrida and 
others have troubled the Husserlian version of phenomenology. 
Consequently, applications of Husserl to theatre and performance scholarship 
should acknowledge the limitations of the reduction as originally conceived. The 
paradoxes of language and genesis in Husserl’s method burden claims about the 
essences of the experience of performance or of particular objects of performance. 
Phenomenology will continue to occupy an important place in the study of 
theatre and performance, especially as scholars come to recognize the relevance 
of cognitive neuroscience to the phenomenological project of articulating the 
contours and limitations of perception. The human neural machinery is understood 
by Merleau-Ponty as one term in the highly complex equation of human conscious 
experience, and recent developments in the neurosciences raise exciting prospects 
for detailed studies into the phenomenology of theatre and performance informed 
by an understanding of the brain and its collaboration with the senses and the 
body. There is a great potential for phenomenologically-minded investigations of 
consciousness of performance through formulations that do not naïvely import the 
Husserlian reduction in order to access the essence of some aspect of performance. 
As Husserl’s project continues to be adapted and updated, fresh perspectives on 
the relation of consciousness to objects of performance will emerge. 
The phenomenology of Husserl will also be important to theatre studies 
as an ideological complex with a special relationship to theatre in the Western 
tradition. Husserl’s emphasis on presence and the special status of vision within 
his phenomenology, as well as the structure of his reduction itself, resonates with 
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the importance of presence to Western theatre, the development of a Western 
theatre architecture model that prioritizes vision over other senses, and the 
selecting/bracketing function of the proscenium arch. When Derrida, in Speech 
and Phenomena, comments that “phenomenological reduction is a scene, a theater 
stage,” he metaphorically relates the structure of a mode of consciousness that is 
contingent and bound to a speciﬁc historical moment to the conceptual/architectural 
form of the Western theatre. Both constructions depend on the direction of the 
conscious mind toward a strictly delimited object, both enforce the silence of that 
which surrounds that object of attention, and both make presence the casting criteria 
for the role of the object. Rather than treating Husserl’s phenomenology as a method 
whose application can negate the interference of mundane conscious life in order 
to reveal the transcendent qualities of the world, theatre scholars might analyze 
phenomenology as a mental object whose positive content amounts to instructions 
for a peculiar mode of consciousness, a mode whose structure uncannily resembles 
that of the Western theatrical event itself.  
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